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Abstract—The mass integration and deployment of intelligent
technologies within critical commercial, industrial and public
environments have a significant impact on business operations
and society as a whole. Though integration of these critical intel-
ligent technologies pose serious embedded security challenges for
technology manufacturers which are required to be systematically
approached, in-line with international security regulations.
This paper establish security foundation for such intelligent
technologies by deriving embedded security requirements to
realise the core security functions laid out by international
security authorities, and proposing microarchitectural charac-
teristics to establish cyber resilience in embedded systems. To
bridge the research gap between embedded and operational
security domains, a detailed review of existing embedded security
methods, microarchitectures and design practises is presented.
The existing embedded security methods have been found ad-hoc,
passive and strongly rely on building and maintaining trust. To
the best of our knowledge to date, no existing embedded security
microarchitecture or defence mechanism provides continuity of
data stream or security once trust has broken. This function-
ality is critical for embedded technologies deployed in critical
infrastructure to enhance and maintain security, and to gain
evidence of the security breach to effectively evaluate, improve
and deploy active response and mitigation strategies. To this end,
the paper proposes three microarchitectural characteristics that
shall be designed and integrated into embedded architectures to
establish, maintain and improve cyber resilience in embedded
systems for next-generation critical infrastructure.
Index Terms—Cyber Resilient Embedded System, Cyber Re-
silience, Cyber-Physical Embedded System, Critical Infrastruc-
ture, Active Defence, Response, Recover, Security Regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Proliferation of intelligent connected technologies are open-
ing venues to new service and computing models, providing
diverse socio-economic benefits. These technologies are giving
rise to wide range of intelligent applications including smart
home, smart city, smart grid and intelligent transportation sys-
tems [1], [2]. Estimates from market leading industry predict
that intelligent connected technologies will proliferate to a
trillion devices by 2035 [3]. This rapid growth of intelligent
consumer and industrial solutions is leading to significant
growth in smart embedded devices, such as wearables and
critical infrastructure components, that provide information
and communication functions to the users and businesses.
These smart embedded devices will be integrated and de-
ployed in public and private environments for commercial and
non-commercial purposes, to enhance business and consumer
experiences by sharing and analysing generated data [4], [5].
This data can be used in a variety of ways, enhancing the cus-
tomer’s experience, bringing new business models and market
opportunities using artificial intelligence, machine learning and
data analytics, to make better informed decisions. However,
where this sharing of data brings benefits and opportunities,
it simultaneously presents risks [6]. The large-scale integra-
tion and deployment of smart embedded devices and related
services within critical infrastructure environments to control
critical tasks, poses serious design, supply chain, security and
safety challenges [2], [7], [8], [9].
As reliance on these technologies has grown, opportunities
have arisen for adversaries to attack and compromise public
and commercial critical infrastructure systems [4], [5], [6].
Therefore, international government agencies have released
cyber security regulations [10], [11], [12] to curtail this
problem by advocating businesses and technology manufac-
turers to comply and adhere to these regulations. These
cyber security regulations pose a need for smart embedded
devices and intelligent technologies to be Cyber Resilient.
Device manufacturers therefore should design, develop and
deploy security within their products to maintain compliance,
consumer confidence and market share. However this need for
harnessing security to comply with cyber security regulations,
has compelled embedded designers and security architects to
deploy defences that are often ad-hoc and passive in nature.
As they have been designed to mitigate a certain class of
known attacks [13]. Nevertheless, this strategy has been found
vulnerable and compromised due to software vulnerabilities,
microarchitectural weaknesses and poor use of secure design
practices [8], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18].
Open literature and reported events show that attack meth-
ods are evolving and becoming sophisticated, software vul-
nerabilities are inevitable, embedded architectures are insecure
and are therefore susceptible to diverse attacks [13], [16]. A
successful launch of an attack on a device can expose private
and confidential data of the user and enterprise to adversaries.
To best of our knowledge, no existing embedded security
microarchitecture or defence mechanism provides continuity
of data stream and the information that can be extracted to
gain and establish an evidence caused by the security breach
for Cyber Forensics.
Considering these diverse cyber security challenges, there
is a need for adopting a holistic rather than continue pursuing
passive approach to achieve cyber resilience in embedded
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systems. The architecture shall harness, maintain and ensure
design and operational security. Moreover, it shall be capable
of both detection and recovery from a launched attack, and
preserve crucial security requirements of embedded device
deployed within public and private critical environments.
This paper will present the core security functions set
out by the international security authorities in Section II. A
comprehensive review of existing embedded security practices
and mapping of core security functions to existing embedded
security landscape will be presented in Section III which
will be used to derive the security requirements of a cyber
resilient embedded system. The shortcomings of well estab-
lished embedded security microarchitectures will be discussed
in Section IV and microarchitectural characteristics of a cyber
resilient embedded system will be proposed in Section V.
II. CYBER RESILIENCE & CYBER SECURITY
REGULATIONS
Currently, major differences exist in the way companies are
using technologies and adopting security practices into their
design, development and operational processes making it more
difficult to mitigate and fight against cyber attacks [14]. This
problem has been elevated by the lack of adoption of security
and cyber resilient posture by the stakeholders. IT Governance
is a global provider of cyber risk and privacy management
solutions that defines Cyber resilience [19] as:
”The ability of a system to identify, prevent, and respond to
cyber attacks, intended to disrupt the system’s operational
capabilities while maintaining confidentiality and integrity of
the data”
To streamline these security issues, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Cyber Se-
curity Centre (NCSC) have released the following frameworks
and regulations to improve security:
• NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF)
• NIST Cyber Security Framework (CSF)
• NSCS Security of Network and Information Systems
Regulations (NIS)
The NIST Risk Management Framework [11] is a guidance
document designed to help organisations and enterprises assess
and manage risks to their information and infrastructure. It
enables a process that integrates security and risk management
activities within the system development life cycle as shown
in Figure 1. It provides means to select, implement, assess,
authorise and monitor controls. This involves identification
of critical components based on their security requirements
followed by selection and implementation of effective moni-
toring controls, that are aligned with the system’s operational
behaviour. This process enables security architects to identify
risks, select suitable mitigation strategies and deploy coun-
termeasures. This also avoid vulnerabilities which might be
overlooked in product functional specification.
The NIST Cyber Security Framework [10] aims to improve
the security of critical infrastructure from cyber attacks. It
provides a set of guidelines for technology manufacturers to
Fig. 1. Core security functions, principles and activities of NIST Risk
Management Framework [11], NIST Cyber Security Framework [10] and
NCSC Security of Network and Information System Regulations [12].
follow and better prepare to handle cyber attacks, particularly
where a lack of security standardisation exists. The framework
defines five core security functions (identify, detect, protect,
respond and recover) to establish, maintain and improve cyber
resilience as illustrated in Figure 1.
The primary focus of NCSC Security of Network and
Information Systems (NIS) [12] regulation is to respond to
rising cyber security challenges faced by public/private organ-
isations and enterprises by minimising the risks of disruption
to services caused by the failure of digital technologies. One of
the key objectives is to establish and improve cyber resilience
of intelligent technologies by identifying and managing risks
of potential causes of failure by gaining and establishing an
evidence of the caused security breach. For this purpose,
the regulation introduces four security principles (managing
security risks, protecting against cyber attacks, detecting cyber
security incidents and minimising the impact of incidents) as
shown in Figure 1.
The discussed frameworks and regulations advocates that it
is essential for technology manufacturers and their involved
partners, including semiconductor and original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs), to manage their risks by implementing
appropriate and proportionate embedded security measures for
next-generation critical infrastructure.
III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF
CYBER RESILIENT EMBEDDED SYSTEM
Cyber Resilience in embedded systems can be achieved
by identifying the security requirements and incorporating
them into the product life cycle. Intrinsically, the discussed
Cyber Security regulations in Section II do not render security
requirements for cyber resilient embedded system. Instead they
TABLE I
ASSOCIATION OF NIS SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND CSF CORE SECURITY FUNCTIONS, THEIR RESPECTIVE OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND DERIVED
EMBEDDED SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A CYBER RESILIENT EMBEDDED SYSTEM. MAPPING OF EXISTING EMBEDDED SECURITY LANDSCAPE ON TO
THE DRIVEN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IS ALSO PRESENTED.
NSCS NIS NIST CSF Operational Security Cyber Resilient Existing Embedded Security Practices,
[12] [10] Requirements Embedded Security Requirements Methods and Microarchitectures
Asset Management Embedded Security Modelling
Managing • Understand and Assess • Risk Assessment J STRIDE, PASTA, CVSS, DREAD, HARA
Security Identify • Identify Risks • Threat and Security Modelling v IEC 61508, ISO2626 (ASIL A-D), ISO/IEC 15408
Risks • Prioritise and Evaluate • Attack surface identification v Common Criteria, FIPS 140-2, ETSI TVRA
• Comply and Review • Secure-by-design practises v ISO/IEC 27005, SAE J3061, ISO/IEC 27001
Awareness Control Protection Method
Protecting • Protect Data • Chain of Trust Root of Trust, Trusted Technologies, J Secure boot
against Protect • Protection Technology • Data Confidentiality and Integrity J AES, ECC, RSA, EDSA, ECCDSA, SHA, SSL
Cyber attack • Manage & Adopt • Secure Provisioning & Attestation J Digital Certificate, Public-Private Key Infrastructure
• Isolation and Segregation J ARM TrustZone, Intel SGX
Event Discovery Detection Method
Detecting • Discover & Determine • Platform Security Architecture J ARM Platform Security Architecture
Cyber Security Detect • Continuous Monitoring • Trusted Execution Environment J Global Platform, ARM TEE, QSEE, Kinibi
Incidents • Detect Anomalies • Static & Dynamic Flow Integrity J Dover [20], Y ARMHEx [21]
• Alert Events • Access Control and Policing Y SECA [22]
Response Planning Response Method
• Analyse detected events • Platform Security Manager J Trusted Platform Module
Minimising the Respond • Response Strategy • Physical Security J Side-channel countermeasure
impact of • Mitigation Strategy • Passive countermeasure J Reboot, Reset, Key zeroisation
• Report & Improve • Active countermeasure
cyber security Recovery Planning Recovery Method
incidents • Repair and Update • Roll-back and Roll-forward J Secure Firmware Update, On-the-air update
Recover • Improve and Train • Fault avoidance and tolerance J Single event upset, Parity, Error Correction Codes
• Communicate • Static and Dynamic Redundancy J Hardware/Software redundancy, Process pairs
• Evidence Collection • System Monitoring J Voltage, clock and temperature monitors
v International Standard ; J Commercially Available ; Y Academic Research Frameworks/Solutions
yield a blueprint which can be used to articulate and derive
security requirements for cyber resilient embedded system.
Table I shows the association between NIS security principles
and CSF core security functions and their operational security
requirements. This includes asset management, awareness
control, event discovery, response planning and recovery plan-
ning which are used to derive the security requirements of
a cyber resilient embedded system. To bridge the research
gap between information security and embedded security, the
mapping of each driven embedded security requirement onto
existing embedded security landscape is presented in Table I.
1© IDENTIFY and manage cyber security risks by conducting
asset management which involves detailed understanding of an
application use case and respective deployment scenario. This
requires decomposition of system components and evaluation
of their interactions with internal and external entities to
identify their associated risks and threats [23]. This is followed
by evaluating and prioritising tasks, where potential damage
to the system and its infrastructure for each identified threat.
In embedded domain this process is well established which
involves creating an abstraction of the embedded system [24]
known as Threat and Security Modelling [25], [26]. This builds
profiles of a potential attacker, their goals and methods, which
then used to define and deploy countermeasures either to
mitigate, minimise the impact of the attack or making less
attractive for an attacker. Table I list some of the risk and threat
assessment modelling methods and international standards.
They provide detailed guidelines and specifications to model,
implement and comply diverse security in embedded systems.
2© PROTECT against cyber attacks by introducing system
awareness control. This required deployment of appropriate
data security and protection methods to build a security foun-
dation based on the principles of information assurance [24].
• Confidentiality: Ensuring that information is disclosed
only to intended individuals, entities and processes.
• Integrity: Maintaining and assuring the accuracy and
completeness of information over its life cycle.
• Availability: Ensuring that information must be available
when needed by individuals, entities and processes.
• Authentication: Ensuring that information is accessible
by only authorised individuals, entities and processes.
In the embedded security domain, well-established
cryptography-based protection methods have been published
as shown in Table I. These protection methods require strong
trust anchor to establish and maintain confidentiality, integrity
and authentication [24], [27], [28]. In addition, embedded
access control protection methods such as ARM TrustZone
and Intel SGX have been widely used to achieve resource
isolation and segregation by dividing system into subsystems
and isolating their memory spaces.
3© DETECT cyber security incidents using event discovery
methods. This requires detection of malicious activity by con-
tinuous monitoring of system critical resources and comparing
it against the healthy behaviour. Once malicious activity is
detected, generate an alert to initiate a mitigation strategy.
In the embedded security domain, there is a significant
published literature on signature, anomaly and information
flow-based detection methods [21], [22] as shown in Table I.
Within embedded architectures, these security mechanisms
have been deployed at hardware and software layers managed
by a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [29].
4© RESPOND to detected threats and malicious activities by
planning and deploying an effective response and mitigation
strategy to limit and reduce the impact of the cyber attack.
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication is an enabling
technology for critical infrastructure [1], which brought serious
security challenges to secure, verify and avoid man-in-middle
attacks in embedded systems. The existing embedded systems
lack the capability to respond against attacks, making a need
for active response against attacks a fundamental security
requirement for cyber resilient embedded systems. Neverthe-
less, constantly evolving cyber attacks demand continuous re-
evaluation for effective response and mitigation strategies.
Existing embedded security microarchitectures are largely
focused on trust-based security and protection. They are limted
and provide passive countermeasures such as watchdog timer,
brownout reset, voltage and temperature monitoring and anti-
tamper. Where, the vast majority system do not have any
response mechanism and curtail such attacks using system
reboot and reset. Nevertheless, trust management between
device manufacturers and service providers is still a formidable
challenge [2]. Clearly, there is a strong need for embedded re-
sponse methods and microarchitectures that fulfil the security
requirements of cyber resilient embedded system.
5© RECOVER system data and resources back to the device
healthy provisioned state, by repairing, updating and patching
the system. However, effective cyber strategy requires identifi-
cation of the causes and method of system failure by collecting
evidence from the compromised system. It allow to establish,
conduct and communicate critical administrative tasks with
the actors involved, during the system life cycle, to effectively
ensure and maintain safety and security of the critical systems.
The existing embedded security architectures are limited to
the principles of reliability to achieve recovery, and thus are
insufficient to provide a system-level information or evidence
that can be used to improve the cyber strategy. They often
make use of fault avoidance and fault tolerant design practises
by incorporating redundant system resources and roll-back
patches to return the system to a healthy state.
The mapping of existing embedded security approaches in
Table I clearly indicates a research gap and need for active
response and recovery methods. Section IV extends this by
discussing challenges and shortcomings of existing embedded
security microarchitectures.
IV. CHALLENGES AND SHORTCOMINGS IN EXISTING
EMBEDDED SECURITY MICORARCHITECTURES
Embedded Security has been the subject of extensive re-
search in the context of general-purpose computing, signal pro-
cessing, programmable architectures and communications sys-
tems [7], with significant published work on various fine and
coarse grained embedded security challenges [7], [8], [9], [30].
Security is often misapprehended by security architects and
system designers as the addition of security features to make
the system secure. Instead, security is a process that should
be considered and managed throughout the life cycle of the
embedded system specially for devices deployed in critical
infrastructure. Therefore, this section first presents challenges
of existing security microarchitectures:
• The majority of embedded security microarchitectures
follow Device Trust Architecture [31]. It is a specification
that provides a method to design and develop secure
component technologies by building trust and secure
services from the boot mechanism to the device operating
system and application layer. Hence, the security of the
system is strongly reliant on building and maintaining
a strong chain of trust [6] which comprises of a series
of nested assumptions and as vulnerable as its weakest
link. If broken, compromises the security of the whole
system. In the commercial domain, Secure Boot is a well
established and widely used secure component, which has
been found vulnerable [15], [16].
• A lack of clear ownership of device security, insufficient
adoption of security-aware practises and an absence of
baseline security requirements. Practically design engi-
neers do not perceive themselves accountable for security
requirements and effectively embedding them into the
device life cycle. This includes a lack of formal security
risk assessment, with management of security technology
outsourced to third parties for design, development and
formalised security patch management process. As a
result, this integration of third party services leads to
security inconsistencies and vulnerabilities.
These challenges have posed immense need for harnessing
security, in compliance with cyber security regulations. This
in turn, has compelled embedded security architects to design
and deploy defence mechanisms that are often ad-hoc and
passive in nature, targeting and mitigating certain attacks or
classes of attacks after they have been discovered [13]. This
approach may be effective to rectify software vulnerabilities
or bugs through a software update, but insufficient to realise
effective microarchitecture security which cannot be updated
after release. The following are widely adopted embedded
security methods has been found vulnerable due too poor
usage of secure design practises, software vulnerabilities and
microarchitectural weaknesses:
• Trusted Computing: Trusted software services uses
cryptographic digital signatures to verify the integrity of
the firmware and applications which has been exploited
to gain access to the device [16]. This has occurred due to
lack of roll-back prevention, as the system was using the
same digital signature to verify the application. A similar
attack has been performed against commercial TEE [32].
• Processor virtualisation and logical isolation of re-
sources: In existing embedded security architectures, pro-
cessor virtualisation has been used to achieve logical iso-
lation between secure and non-secure system resources.
This has been attacked through a covert cache-based
attack, resulting in leaking of information using mi-
croarchitecture side-channels. The recently demonstrated
Spectre [18] attack leverage speculative loads which cir-
cumvent access checks to read memory-resident secrets,
transmitting them to an attacker using cache timing or
other covert communication channels. Meltdown [17]
is another microarchitectural attack that exploits out-of-
order execution to leak the targets physical memory.
These attacks exploit the fact that both secure and non-
secure processes shares the same physical memory re-
source and pointer. Maene et al. have proposed a data
encryption mechanism [27] that allows automatic encryp-
tion and decryption of data between the main memory and
cache though found infeasible due to large area overhead.
• Pointer Authentication: To circumvent the microarchi-
tecture side-channel leakage attacks, a pointer authentica-
tion mechanism has been introduced [33]. This guarantees
the integrity of pointers by extending each pointer with
authentication code, allowing verification using special
instructions that are part of the code executing on the
same physical computing resource and managed by the
software. Similarly, to mitigate branch prediction attacks,
deployment of separate stacks and their pointer registers
has been introduced in ARM Cortex-M33 processors.
• Vulnerable system communication: A security evalua-
tion of the ARM TrustZone technology has demonstrated
that it is possible to modify hardware security attributes
and communication bus handshaking signals [34]. This
has demonstrated by integrating ARM TrustZone tech-
nology with reconfigurable hardware logic.
These microarchitectural weaknesses clearly indicates the
need for cyber resilient embedded security microarchitecture
that support active detection, response and recovery mecha-
nisms to effectively realise diverse cyber security strategies
through the life cycle of an embedded device. To this end,
Section V proposes micro-architectural characteristics of a
cyber resilient embedded system.
V. MICROARCHITECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
A CYBER RESILIENT EMBEDDED SYSTEM
As discussed, there is no active method in existing embed-
ded microarchitectures to establish and maintain the security of
a device once its trust is compromised. This leads to exposure
of confidential data to the adversary, often without leaving any
evidence trail. Considering the derived security requirements
of cyber resilient embedded system (Table I), security func-
tionality is not limited to protection. The device must detect
malicious cyber activities and attacks, respond against them by
deploying active countermeasures and recover system back to
its healthy state. These are crucial security requirements for
embedded devices deployed in critical infrastructure as well as
to facilitate forensic analysis, to study behaviour and method
of cyber attacks. Using existing embedded security microar-
chitectures, this is difficult and implausible to recover data due
to lack of continuity of data stream, runtime monitoring and
system-level visibility. The following are proposed three core
microarchitectural characteristics that shall allow to establish
historical system data stream by continuous monitoring of
system resources and activities, keeping track of events to
achieve system-level visibility:
1) An Independent Active Runtime System Security
Manager shall be responsible for protection, detection,
response and recovery security functions while compli-
menting existing security mechanisms. It shall continu-
ously monitor system resources, use gathered informa-
tion to detect benign or malicious system behaviour,
respond to detected malicious (system or resource-
specific) activities by deploying active countermeasures
and recover system back to its healthy state. It is
crucial that system security manager must be physically
independent and isolated so its memory resources from
the general purpose processor. This physical limiting
of attack surface, will make the system robust and
significantly less susceptible to software vulnerabilities
and attacks as was in the case of the TEE. As TEE shares
the same physical processor and memory resources with
the general purpose processor. Effective realisation of
this system security manager requires resource-level
visibility and monitoring of system’s critical components
which leads to the second characteristic.
2) An Active Runtime Resource Monitors shall ac-
tively monitor resource specific behaviour to detect
malicious activity and report it to the System Security
Manager. These active monitors are essential as em-
bedded architectures are becoming complex, designers
are consolidating diverse functionalities into a single
application often involves mixing of sensitive data with
non-sensitive data and physical actuation. These active
monitors shall generate fine-grained resource specific
information which would enable the system security
manager to articulate, analyse and evaluate system-level
behaviours and initiate appropriate response and recov-
ery strategies. In addition, this gathered information
would facilitate continuity of data stream and to extract
crucial information necessary to establish evidence of
the caused security breach.
3) An Active Response Manager shall be responsible for
implementing response and recovery embedded security
requirements of a cyber resilient embedded system. It
shall actively enforce and execute the response and
recovery strategies initiated by the System Security Man-
ager. This involves initiating active countermeasures
to mitigate and curtail the detected threat to maintain
and ensure security of the system. Moreover, depending
on the microarchitecture of the active runtime resource
monitors, the active response manager can enforce var-
ious system-level security strategies, where a compro-
mised resource can be physically isolated from the
system. This would allow opportunities to gracefully de-
grade the system functionality while maintaining critical
services in next-generation critical infrastructure.
A detailed System-on-Chip (SoC) platform architec-
ture [28], [35] and security modelling approach [25] that
realises the proposed embedded microarchitectural characteris-
tics of a cyber resilient embedded system have been published.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the increasing security challenges
and requirements, in light of international cyber security regu-
lations for intelligent connected technologies deployed in crit-
ical infrastructure. Embedded security requirements has been
derived from these regulations to improve cyber resilience and
achieve conformance. The paper establishes a strong need
for embedded cyber resilience for smart technologies, due
to lack of active detection, response and recovery security
functionalities within existing embedded security systems.
This is due to the majority of embedded security technolo-
gies being guided by trust, which has been compromised due
to a lack of runtime monitoring and system-level visibility of
resources and system activities. Therefore, this paper proposed
three embedded microarchitectural characteristics, allowing
independent active runtime system monitoring and active
response functions to enhance, maintain and ensure secure
operation during the life cycle of the device.
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